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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
AND THE SCOPE OF
THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT
Jerry J. Phillips*
The confrontation clause is that language of the sixth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution which provides, "[I]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."1  Despite the
seemingly absolute language of the confrontation clause, which
would suggest that no hearsay evidence may be admitted against
an accused in a criminal proceeding, its guarantee has been sub-
ject to exception. For example, when either a witness to an event
or his testimony is shown to be unavailable, others will be allowed
to testify as to the information which the declarant-witness has
related about the event in issue. 2 Cross-examination at trial is the
most preferable means of satisfying the demands of the con-
frontation clause. 3 Where necessary, however, less preferable evi-
dence may be introduced. 4 In this example unavailability of the
testimony of the witness may provide the requisite necessity. 5 In
a recent case, however, the United States Supreme Court was
willing to allow admission of less preferable evidence without a
showing of unavailability.6 As a result, the scope of the unavaila-
bility requirement with regard to the confrontation clause is
presently unclear. Further complicating the matter is the principle
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., 1956,
J.D. 196 1, Yale University; M.A., 1964, Cambridge University.
'U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Although similar provisions are found in most state con-
stitutions, C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 252, at 604 (E.
Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK], the Supreme Court has made these
provisions largely superfluous by holding the confrontation clause applicable to the states
in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).2 See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1897); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Other exceptions have also been
recognized. See MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 252, at 606 n. 10.
35 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE § 1397,
at 131 [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
4 1d. §§ 1396, 1402.
5 Id. § 1396.6 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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that unavailability of a witness is often a requirement for the
invocation of an exception to the hearsay rule, such as the admis-
sion of prior testimony. 7 The scope of the unavailability require-
ments for the purposes of the hearsay rule and the confrontation
clause, although often similar, are not necessarily coextensive
This article examines the unavailability requirement, its possible
limitations, its possible expansion in various areas, and finally
recommends that the requirement be broadly applied in criminal
cases.
I. BARBER V. PAGE AND DUTTON v. EVANS:
A DILEMMA
In Barber v. Page9 the United States Supreme Court invoked
the confrontation clause to prevent the introduction into evidence
against the accused of the transcript of testimony taken at a
preliminary hearing in the same case. Petitioner in Barber sought
federal habeas corpus relief, claiming deprivation of his sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights to be confronted with the witnesses
against him at his trial for armed robbery. The principal evidence
against him at trial was the reading to the jury of a transcript of
testimony given at a preliminary hearing. Petitioner's attorney,
although present at the preliminary hearing, did not cross-examine
the declarant of the testimony in question, a codefendant with
petitioner, who had waived his privilege against self-incrimination
during the course of the hearing. At the time of trial, the witness
who had testified at the preliminary hearing was incarcerated in a
federal prison in Texas, approximately 225 miles from the trial
court. The trial court overruled petitioner's seasonable objection
to the reading of the transcript. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the denial of the habeas petition by a court of appeals on
the ground that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate that it
had made a good-faith effort to obtain the presence at trial of the
witness who had given testimony in the preliminary hearing.'0 In
other words, the prosecution had not met its burden of showing
7 MCCORMICK, supra note i, § 253, at 608: "Several exceptions to the hearsay rule
involve a requirement that the declarant be shown to be unavailable as a witness at the
present trial." (Footnote omitted.)
8 See generally Comment, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434
(1966). See also note 38 infra.
9390 U.S. 719 (1968), rev'g 381 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1966). The original conviction is
reported in Barber v. State, 388 P.2d 320 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1963).
10 390 U.S. at 724- 25. See also the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan, id. at 726: "1




the unavailability of the witness before it sought to introduce his
prior testimony.
Two years after deciding Barber, the Court held in Dutton v.
Evans" that the out-of-court declaration of a co-conspirator could
be introduced against the defendant without first showing that the
co-conspirator was unavailable to testify at trial. Evans sought
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that he had been denied
the constitutional right of confrontation during his trial for mur-
der. As a result of that trial, he had been convicted and sentenced
to death. One of twenty prosecution witnesses was an individual
named Shaw. Shaw testified that he and an alleged co-conspirator
of Evans were fellow prisoners after Evans and his co-conspirator
were arraigned. During direct examination Shaw related a state-
ment by the alleged co-conspirator which clearly implied Evans'
guilt. The trial court overruled the objection of Evans' counsel
that the statement was hearsay and thus violative of the right of
confrontation. After the objection was overruled, Evans' counsel
thoroughly cross-examined the witness Shaw. The co-conspirator
who made the statement in question admittedly could have been
subpoenaed as a witness. The principal prosecution witness, how-
ever, was an alleged accomplice who had been granted immunity.
His testimony described at length the circumstances surrounding
the crime in question. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
granted Evans' petition on the ground that the introduction of the
hearsay evidence deprived Evans of his right of confrontation. 12
The Supreme Court reversed this decision.
In deciding Dutton the Court distinguished Barber as follows:
In Barber the "principal evidence" against the petitioner was
a transcript of preliminary hearing testimony admitted by the
trial judge under an exception to the hearsay rule that, by its
terms, was applicable only if the witness was "unavailable."
This hearsay exception "has been explained as arising from
necessity .... 390 U.S., at 722, and we decided only that
Oklahoma could not invoke that concept to use the prelimi-
nary hearing transcript in that case without showing "a
good-faith effort" to obtain the witness' presence at the
trial ....
This case does not involve evidence in any sense "crucial"
or "devastating," as did [Barber] .... It does not involve any
11400 U.S. 74 (1970), rev'g 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968). Evans' original conviction is
reported in Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240 (1966).
12400 F.2d at 831-32.
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suggestion of prosecutorial misconduct or even negligence, as
did ... Barber.' 3
The Court considered a number of other factors as well. Else-
where in its opinion admission of the testimony in Dutton was
found not to violate the confrontation clause because the evidence
contained substantial indicia of reliability.' 4 While observing in a
footnote that the witness who had made the out-of-court state-
ment was in fact available and could have been subpoenaed to
testify by either party,' 5 the Court suggested in its opinion that
had he been subpoenaed the witness probably would have in-
voked his fifth amendment privilege not to testify. 16 To this extent
the witness thus was unavailable. 17
The Dutton decision clearly raises more questions than it an-
swers with regard to the scope of the unavailability requirement
delineated in Barber. Dutton may imply that the holding in Barber
is restricted to its unique facts. Alternatively Dutton can be read
somewhat more generally to require proof of unavailability of the
witness only where the out-of-court testimony is relatively unre-
liable and is also "crucial" or "devastating" to the defendant's
case. Interpreted even more broadly, Dutton might be regarded as
dispensing with this burden of proof when the witness is equally
available to either side, or when it appears likely that the in-court
testimony will be unavailable even if the witness is called. An
examination of these possible limitations on the scope of the
Barber holding, it is submitted, shows each of them to be analyt-
ically unsatisfactory. Moreover, the purposes of the requirement
that a witness be shown to be unavailable before permitting the
'3 400 U.S. at 85, 87 (citation omitted).
14 Williams' [the declarant's] personal knowledge of the identity and role of the
other participants in the triple murder is abundantly established .... [Tihe
possibility that Williams' statement was founded on faulty recollection is
remote in the extreme .... His statement was spontaneous, and it was against
his penal interest to make it.
400 U.S. at 88-89.
15 Counsel for Evans informed us at oral argument that he could have subpoe-
naed Williams but had concluded that this course would not be in the best
interests of his client.
400 U.S. at 88 n. 19. See also id. at 96 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring).
16 Williams, the out-of-court declarant, was tried separately and convicted in connection
with the same transaction, and his conviction was reversed on appeal. See 400 U.S. at 90
n.20.
As a practical matter, unless the out-of-court declaration can be proved by
hearsay evidence, the facts it reveals are likely to remain hidden from the
jury by the declarant's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 99 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also id. at 102 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17 MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 253, at 612: "The exercise of a privilege not to testify




introduction of a hearsay report of his declaration strongly in-
dicate that the application of the requirement should be expanded
in criminal cases.
II. POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR LIMITING
THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT
A. The Preliminary Hearing Aspect of
Barber v. Page
The simplest way to dispose of the Barber decision is to limit it
to its unique facts: the case applies only when the prosecution
seeks to introduce testimony taken at the preliminary hearing in
the case. Support for this interpretation may be found in the
language of the decision itself:
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for
the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary
hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into
the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is
the more limited one of determining whether probable cause
exists to hold the accused for trial. 18
Other decisions by the Court in this area lend support to
limiting Barber to its facts. In Berger v. California19 the Supreme
Court addressed a fact situation in which a transcript of testimony
obtained in a preliminary hearing of the same case was admitted
at trial, the declarant being absent from the jurisdiction. In giving
retroactive application to the holding of Barber, the Court stated:
[W]e held in the case of Barber v. Page... that the absence
of a witness from the jurisdiction would not justify the use at
trial of preliminary hearing testimony unless the State had
made a good-faith effort to secure the witness' presence. 20
In addition the Berger Court stated that "Barber v. Page was
clearly foreshadowed, if not preordained, by this Court's decision
in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) .... "21
Pointer22 also involved the introduction at trial of a transcript
of testimony given at a preliminary hearing in the same case, at
which hearing the defendant was neither represented by counsel
18390 U.S. at 725.
19 393 U.S. 314 (1969).
20 Id. at 3 15.
21 Id.
22 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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nor given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. At trial,
the prosecution showed that the witness was absent from the
jurisdiction. In reversing his conviction, the Court commented on
the inadequacies of preliminary hearing testimony for the requi-
sites of the confrontation clause. 23
Nevertheless, it does not appear that the Barber decision
should be restricted solely to preliminary hearing testimony. Pre-
liminary hearing testimony, coming within the category of prior
trial testimony, is regarded as one possible exception to the hear-
say rule. 24 The primary defect with evidence received at a prelimi-
nary hearing is that it may not have been subjected to adequate
cross-examination. 25 Yet the Court clearly stated in Barber that
the holding of the case was intended to apply even where there
had been cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. 6 Motes v.
23 E.g., id. at 407:
Because the transcript of Phillips' statement offered against petitioner at his
trial had not been taken at a time and under circumstances affording petition-
er through counsel an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Phillips, its
introduction in a federal court in a criminal case against Pointer would have
amounted to denial of the privilege of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.
See also the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, id. at 409.
24 Preliminary hearing testimony is similar both to testimony offered during a deposition
and to testimony given at trial. With regard to satisfying the hearsay rule, the com-
mentators treat both situations as one. Although recognizing that "there is in most
jurisdictions more or less inconsistency on this subject," Wigmore states:
There is on principle no distinction between a deposition and former
testimony as to the conditions upon which either may be used at the trial.
So far as the circumstances make it impossible to obtain the witness'
personal presence for testifying, by reason of his death, illness, absence from
the jurisdiction, and the like, that impossibility exists in precisely the same
degree for a deposition and for former testimony to a jury,-supposing, of
course, that in each case there has been cross-examination. There is on
principle not the slightest ground for failing to recognize all the dispensing
circumstances as equally sufficient for both kinds of testimony.
WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1401, at 146. See also MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 254, at
614- 15.
25 Wigmore firmly asserts that an essential purpose of the requirement of confrontation
is "to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination." WIGMORE, supra
note 3, § 1395, at 123 (emphasis in original).
26 "Moreover, we would reach the same result on the facts of this case had petitioner's
counsel actually cross-examined Woods [the witness) at the preliminary hearing." 390
U.S. at 725.
It seems to follow from the Barber opinion that preliminary hearing testimony of a
witness who has been cross-examined by the defendant will be admissible in a subsequent
trial of the defendant if the prosecution can show good-faith inability to produce the
witness. Subsequent cases have generally so held. See King v. Fitzharris, 311 F. Supp.
400 (C.D. Cal. 1970); State v. Dixon, 107 Ariz. 415, 489 P.2d 255 (1971); People v.
Bynum, 4 Cal. 3d 589, 483 P.2d 1193, 94 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1971); State v. Washington, 206
Kan. 336,479 P.2d 833 (1971); People v. McIntosh, 34 Mich. App. 578, 191 N.W.2d 749
(197 1). But see State v. Villarreal, 94 Idaho 246,486 P.2d 257 (197 1).
It is unclear, however, whether there may be a waiver of the right to cross-examine at
the preliminary hearing. At one point in the opinion the Barber Court indicated there can
be no such waiver. 390 U.S. at 725. In the next paragraph, however, the possibility of
waiver is implied. Id. at 625-26. Cf. United States v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611 (10th Cir.
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United States,2 7 which was cited by the Barber Court in support
of this latter proposition, involved a situation in which preliminary
hearing testimony, which had been the subject of cross-examina-
tion by the defense, was held to have been erroneously admitted
in violation of the confrontation clause because of the negligence
of the prosecution in failing to make the witness available at trial.
This issue has been laid to rest, however, by Mancusi v.
Stubbs.28 There the Court expressly applied the Barber rule to
prior testimony given in court before it considered whether the
requirements of Dutton had been met. The significance of the
Stubbs holding may be weakened by the fact that the defendant
had claimed that because of the late appointment of counsel, he
had had an inadequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness
at the prior trial. Yet the Court nowhere indicated that the ap-
plicability of the Barber rule turned on this fact. There is, how-
ever, a division of authority as to whether the Barber rule must be
satisfied as a precondition to the admission of evidence under
hearsay exceptions other than prior testimony. 29
Furthermore, no post-Dutton case which appies the Barber rule
to either preliminary hearing or prior court testimony has made
the applicability of that rule turn on considerations such as wheth-
er the evidence is sufficiently reliable or whether it was "crucial"
or "devastating" to the case. Either these considerations should
form a part of the Barber standard of admissibility, or they should
be irrelevant to the Dutton determination.
Thus, because of the similarities between preliminary hearing
testimony and all prior testimony taken under oath and subject to
1969), and People v. Martin, 21 Mich. App. 667, 176 N.W.2d 470 (1970), holding that
only the opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing is necessary in order to
satisfy Barber, where the witness is unavailable at trial. Unless the waiver doctrine of the
Allen and Martin cases were followed, the defendant could prevent use of preliminary
hearing testimony at trial in all cases by simply refusing to cross-examine all preliminary
hearing witnesses. Adoption of the waiver doctrine thus allows the subsequent use of
preliminary hearing testimony without requiring that there actually have been full
cross-examination.
27 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
28 408 U.S. 204 (1972). This case relaxes the Barber requirement of good-faith effort by
holding that the prosecution need not ask a witness residing outside the country to attend
voluntarily and testify at trial where the prosecution lacks any statutory method of
compelling attendance through cooperation with the government of the country in which
the witness resides.
29 Compare United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 932 (1971) (co-conspirator's admission); United States ex rel. SEAMAN V. CRYAN,
329 F. Supp. 875 (D.N.J. 1971) (co-conspirator's admission); People v. Brawley, I Cal. 3d
277, 461 P.2d 361, 82 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1969) (co-conspirator's admission); State v. Cook,
440 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1969) (hospital records); with United States ex rel. Oliver v. Rundle,
417 F.2d 305 (3rd Cir. 1969) (testimony at juvenile court hearing); State v. Loggins, 13
Ariz. App. 577, 479 P.2d 724 (1971) (abstract of prior judgment of conviction); State v.
Lunn, 82 N.M. 526, 484 P.2d 368 (1971) (spontaneous declaration); Schepps v. State, 432
S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (principal-accomplice admission).
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cross-examination, there is no reason to restrict the Barber rule to
preliminary hearing testimony. Furthermore, there is no reason to
restrict the Barberrule even to all prior testimony. It is true that a
general distinction could perhaps be made between the prior testi-
mony exceptions and other exceptions to the hearsay rule on the
ground that prior testimony is less reliable than the other ex-
ceptions because it makes more time for reflection available to the
testifying witness. This difference is, however, only one of de-
gree30 and seems clearly counterbalanced by the advantages of
cross-examination under oath, an assurance of reliability that
applies to prior testimony and not to other hearsay exceptions.
This analysis supports the conclusion that the rule announced in
Barber applies in situations other than the precise facts of that
case.
B. The Common-Law Requirement of Unavailability
Another possibility is to read Barber as applying only to situ-
ations in which proof of unavailability would be required at com-
mon law as a condition to the admission of hearsay evidence. 31
Some support for this conclusion may be found in the statement in
Dutton that the disputed evidence in Barber was admissible "un-
der an exception to the hearsay rule that, by its terms, was
applicable only if the witness was 'unavailable.' -32
This analysis is subject to the same infirmity inherent in re-
stricting Barber to the prior testimony exception. This view must
reasonably assume that common-law exceptions applying the re-
quirement of unavailability do so for some special, rational rea-
son; but there is no support for such a conclusion. On the con-
trary, common-law applicability of the unavailability requirement
seems to have developed more or less arbitrarily with no fixed
30 While declarations of present sensory impressions and excited utterances generally
allow little time for reflection, declarations of state of mind or physical condition, or
business entries and public records may allow a significant length of time for reflection
after the occurrence of the events to which the declarations refer. At common law,
however, none of these hearsay exceptions requires proof of unavailability. On the other
hand, dying declarations and statements of recent perception, which also allow little time
for reflection, generally do require proof of unavailability. See Rules 803-804 of the
proposed FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE [hereinafter cited as FED. R. Ev.]
The comment to FED. R. Ev. 804 (which rule requires a showing of unavailability for
exceptions included within it) notes that the former testimony exception embodied in Rule
804 may permit "the strongest hearsay" to come in and should perhaps be included under
Rule 803, which does not require proof of unavailability. The drafters nevertheless includ-
ed the exception under Rule 804, which does require proof of unavailability. The only
reason given for this decision is that "tradition, founded in experience, uniformly favors
production of the witness" where this exception is applicable.
31 See generally WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 1401- 1418.
32 400 U.S. at 85 (emphasis added).
[VOL. 6:327
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consensus as to the exceptions that are affectedP3 Thus, while it
has been suggested that the unavailability requirement applies to
the less reliable exceptions to the hearsay rule,3 4 one cannot argue
that the requirement has actually been applied in this manner.
It is even difficult to decide whether the statement involved in
Dutton should be classed as a common-law exception that re-
quires proof of unavailability, or as one that does not require such
proof. In Dutton, the defendant's alleged co-conspirator, while in
prison awaiting trial, allegedly stated, "If it hadn't been
for... Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." 3 5 If the state-
ment were viewed as one against the declarant's interest, proof of
unavailability would normally be required at common lawP6 If, on
the other hand, it were viewed as an admission by a
co-conspirator, such proof would not be required at common
law.3 7 The statement does not fit within the usual common-law
co-conspirator exception, because it was made after completion of
the conspiracy. In any event, the Court in Dutton -except for its
cryptic reference to the Barber exception as one that "by its
terms" required proof of unavailability-apparently gave no
weight to the role of the common-law requirement of unavailabil-
ity in reaching its decision on the facts of the case before it.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made it amply clear that
common-law definitions of admissibility based on exceptions to
the hearsay rule do not determine whether confrontation require-
ments have been met.38 This position seems eminently sound, for
3 3 See, e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964),
holding that proof of unavailability was not required as a condition to introduction of an
out-of-court statement against penal interest. See also note 64 and accompanying text
infra.34 MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 253, at 608:
Thus the group of hearsay exceptions where unavailability is required are in
a sense second class in comparison with the far larger number of exceptions
where availability or unavailability is not a factor.
McCormick's catalogue of recurring fact situations which may satisfy a requirement of
unavailability includes death, absence from the jurisdiction, physical inability to testify,
mental incapacity to testify, failure of memory, exercise of privilege, refusal to testify,
supervening disqualifications, and depositions. Compare FED. R. Ev. 804(a).
35 Quoted in 400 U.S. at 77.
3 6 WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 1455, 1456: MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 276.
37 WIGMIORE, supra note 3, §§ 1049, 1079; MCCORMICK, supra note I, §§ 263, 267.
38 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970):
The issue before us is the considerably narrower one of whether a defend-
ant's constitutional right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" is
necessarily inconsistent with a State's decision to change its hearsay rules to
reflect the minority view described above. While it may readily be conceded
that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to
protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is
complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed
historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a
WINTER 1973]
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the reason that constitutional policy should be measured by in-
dependent standards of reasonableness.39 A state is permitted to
determine what types of out-of-court statements it regards as
falling within exceptions to the hearsay rule. Once such an ex-
ception is established as a matter of state law, only the United
States Supreme Court should be able to determine finally whether
the exception meets those requirements of unavailability which
satisfy the confrontation clause.
C. The Balancing Approach
Another approach to Barber is to balance the unavailability
requirement against considerations of reliability and importance of
the out-of-court testimony. This approach is suggested by Dutton,
for the Court there found that the incriminatory statement alleg-
edly made by Evans' co-conspirator had several elements of
reliability, including spontaneity, declaration against penal in-
terest, and knowledge on the part of the declarant. 0 The Court
also noted that the evidence admitted was neither "crucial" nor
"devastating" to the defendant's case. 1
A balancing approach toward the issue of reliability commends
itself as more rational than merely attempting to pigeonhole evi-
dence as either within or without exceptions to the hearsay rule
and confrontation requirements. An assessment of the reliability
of the evidence involves determinations of whether the declarant
may have had a motive to prevaricate or may have been mistaken,
as well as whether an in-court examination would add sig-
nificantly to or detract from its presumed reliability. 42
The emphasis in Dutton on crucialness of the testimony sug-
gests an approach analogous to the harmless-error rule, although
it is clear from the plurality opinion of the decision that admission
of the testimony in issue was not considered erroneous.4 It is
difficult, however, to conceive that an inquiry into the crucial or
devastating nature of evidence does not imply the possible exis-
congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of con-
frontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an
arguably recognized hearsay exception.
39 "Present hearsay law does not merit a permanent niche in the Constitution; indeed, its
ripeness for reform has been a unifying theme of evidence literature." Comment, supra
note 8, at 1436.
40400 U.S. at 88-89.
41 Id. at 87.
42 See, e.g., FED. R. Ev. 803(4)- (6), (8), (24), 804(2), (4), (6), and comments thereto.
43 Two of the justices in the plurality also filed a concurring opinion finding harmless
error, 400 U.S. at 93, while the dissenters argued, inter alia, that admission of the evidence
did constitute harmful error. Id. at 108- 1l.
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tence of error, since if there is no error this inquiry is irrelevant.
The standard of harmlessness "beyond a reasonable doubt," 4
derived from the harmless-error doctrine, seems more restrictive
than the Dutton doctrine of noncrucialness, and presumably the
former places a heavier burden on the prosecution to show ab-
sence of harm.
One commentator has emphasized the need for readily applied
rules of thumb to determine admissibility of evidence at the trial
level, because these determinations must be made during the heat
of trial when the judge has little opportunity for reflection. 45 This
argument fails to take into account the large measure of discretion
presently vested in trial judges in determining the admissibility of
hearsay.46 In any event, a reasoned approach to the admissibility
of evidence seems preferable to a mechanical one.
The primary difficulty with the balancing approach implied by
Dutton lies not in justifying the use of discretion, but in determin-
ing the proper relationships among the indicated discretionary
elements. If out-of-court testimony is crucial but nonreliable, it
should be excluded without regard to the issue of unavailability.
Similarly, evidence which is not crucial and is unreliable should
also be excluded, although its admission might constitute harmless
error. The treatment of reliable evidence poses a somewhat more
difficult question. If it is not crucial, there is little reason to admit
reliable evidence at all unless the prosecution can show necessity
based on unavailability. Presumably proof of unavailability is
required where reliable evidence is also crucial, but it is not clear
whether the burden of proof varies as a function of how reliable or
crucial the evidence is.
A fixed rule which uniformly requires proof of unavailability
has the advantage of circumventing the more troublesome issues
of reliability and crucialness in those cases where the witness can
be produced because these other issues will never be faced in
such cases. Although it is not always easy to determine whether
the prosecution has in good faith established the requisite una-
vailability,47 this determination is far easier to make than are
44Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
4Comment, supra note 8, at 1437.
46 Wigmore argues, for example, that rulings on the time limitation applicable to spon-
taneous declarations should be left "absolutely to the determination of the trial Court."
WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1750, at 154 (emphasis in original). Trial judges also exercise a
great deal of discretion in determining the relative presence of elements such as contempo-
raneity, spontaneity, lack of interest, and general trustworthiness in deciding whether to
admit evidence asserted to fall within an exception to the hearsay rule.47 See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Satterfield v. State, 451 S.W.2d
730 (Ark. 1970); People v. Redd, 273 Cal. App. 2d 345, 78 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1969); People
v. Tees, 386 Mich. 483, 192 N.W.2d 241 (197 1); People v. Nieto, 33 Mich. App. 535, 190
WINTER 1973]
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findings of reliability and crucialness. The Dutton balancing ap-
proach, on the other hand, encourages prosecutors to seek the
admission of evidence on other bases, rather than making a
good-faith effort to obtain the personal testimony of witnesses.
The most important argument, however, for requiring proof of
unavailability as a condition to introducing out-of-court testimony
is that the confrontation clause in effect asserts a judgment that
in-court testimony is always preferable to out-of-court testimony.
In Barber the Supreme Court recognized that confrontation in-
cludes the right to observe demeanor and that this right should not
be dispensed with lightly. 48  No matter how reliable an
out-of-court statement may seem, in-court examination is always
preferable because it will aid either in confirming or refuting such
reliability.
The constitutional argument for a showing of unavailability is
buttressed by the holding of Motes v. United States that the
prosecution may not use out-of-court testimony where it has
negligently permitted in-court testimony to become unavailable.49
The rule in Motes surely applies regardless of whether the evi-
dence is reliable or crucial and regardless of what hearsay ex-
ception within which the evidence may fit.50 It is submitted that
the distinction between negligent failure to produce a witness and
lack of good-faith effort to do so simply requires the drawing of
too thin a line where constitutional rights are involved.
D. The Excuse of Equal Availability
A final possibility for assessing the Dutton limitations on Bar-
ber is based on the fact that in Dutton the witness was equally
available to both sides. The Court noted that Evans' counsel
"informed us at oral argument that he could have subpoenaed
Williams but had concluded that this course would not be in the
best interests of his client." 51 In Barber, on the other hand, the
N.W.2d 579 (1971); Tucker v. Oklahoma, 481 P.2d 167 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1971).
These cases involve a determination of whether the prosecution made a good-faith effort to
locate witnesses. The determination is less difficult where unavailability is a function of the
witness's death, physical or mental disability, loss of memory, exercise of privilege, or
refusal to testify, all of which also satisfy the unavailability requirement. MCCORMICK,
supra note I, § 253, at 609- 12; FED. R. Ev. 804(a).
48 390 U.S. at 721, 725. See also WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1395, at 125-26.
49 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
50 It is generally recognized at common law that the requirement of unavailability is not
met where the proponent procures a witness's absence in order to prevent him from
testifying in court. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878); FED. R. Ev.
804(a)(5).
51400 U.S. at 88 n. 19; id. at 96 n.3 (Harlan, J,, concurring).
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witness was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary of another state,
and his presence in court as a witness could have been compelled
only by means of habeas corpus ad testificandum.
The fault with this distinction is that it turns only on the degree
of relative burden in producing witnesses and fails to answer the
question of who has that burden. Either party could have pro-
duced the witness in Barber because the habeas corpus remedy
was equally available to both.52 Cases applying the Barber rule
have made no distinction based on the degree of availability of the
witness. 53 Where the requirement of unavailability of the witness
is deemed applicable, it will be applied at common law to exclude
out-of-court declarations even if the declarant is present in court
at the time when the evidence is offered. 4 Because there is ample
reason to require the proponent to use the better evidence where
it is easily available, and because his failure to do so raises
suspicions regarding his motives for such failure, this result seems
sensible. Nor is the doctrine of waiver applicable. The defendant
in Barber undoubtedly waived his right to call the witness, but he
did not waive the right to require the prosecution either to call the
witness or to demonstrate the unavailability of the witness before
introducing his out-of-court testimony.
A variant of the argument of equal availability would be to say
that the Dutton Court concluded that the witness would have
been equally unavailable to both sides even if called because he
probably would have invoked his fifth amendment privilege not to
testify. The individual who originated the statement in issue had
been separately charged in the same transaction for which Evans
was on trial,55 and, in view of the pendency of those proceedings,
it is quite possible that he would have invoked his privilege. As a
result, his statement might then have been admissible because the
witness himself was unavailable. 6 Yet it was also possible, of
52 The remedy of habeas corpus ad testificandum, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1970), may be
invoked by any party to a case, as may the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, 9 U.L.A. 91- 101 (1957). But see
Curran v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 259 (D, Del. 1971).53 See, e.g., Mason v. United States, 408 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Mobley, 421 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1970).54 See Sartin v. Stinecipher, 209 Tenn. 20, 348 S.W.2d 492 (1961).
55 400 U.S. at 90 n.20.
56 A witness's invocation of his fifth amendment privilege not to testify is recognized as
satisfying the unavailability requirement. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 253, at 612. The
Supreme Court has noted its willingness to follow this principle in dictum in California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167-68 (1970); accord, People v. Hill, 19 Cal. App. 3d 306,
314- 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. 813, 818 (1971). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion and the
dissenting opinion in Dutton both recognize the possibility that Williams (the witness)
might well have invoked his fifth amendment privilege if called to testify, 400 U.S. at 99,
102 n.4.
In an 8-7 en banc decision reversing the appellate panel, the court in Hoover v. Beto,
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course, that he would not have invoked the privilege, and it seems
inappropriate to restrict constitutional rights on the basis of mere
speculation. The defendant may have been injured to a greater
extent in the eyes of the jury if the witness had been called and
had invoked his fifth amendment protection, 57 but if he wished to
avoid this possible damage he could have waived his right of
confrontation. Because he did not do so, the trial court had no
authority to waive the right for him.
If the Dutton Court intended to base its distinction of Barber
on the issue of equal availability then discussion of the other
distinctions concerning reliability and lack of crucialness of the
testimony were unnecessary. A fair reading of the Dutton deci-
sion indicates, however, that these other distinctions actually pro-
vide the main bases of the Court's holding on the Barber issue.
The factor of equal availability seems hardly more than an after-
thought presented for whatever support it might offer to the
Court's principal reasoning.
Although one may reasonably assume that the Dutton dis-
tinction of Barber is not based on an idea of equal availability, one
should nevertheless ask whether there is any merit to such an
idea. What, in other words, are the disadvantages to be realized
from removing from the prosecution the burden of proving un-
availability in a situation in which either side can call the wit-
ness?58 If there are no disadvantages, then the requirement of
proving unavailability can reasonably be dispensed with in all
such cases.
If the prosecution does not have the burden of proving una-
vailability, then it may become more difficult to impeach the
damaging testimony of a given witness. For if the prosecution can
freely introduce the prior testimony of an unavailable witness,
467 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1972), held that the prosecution could not be required to produce
the defendant's cohort, Sellars, at trial before introducing the latter's confession in-
criminating the defendant, since the cohort had not yet been tried for an offense with which
he was charged arising out of the same transaction for which the defendant was on trial.
The court apparently assumed that the cohort, if called, would have invoked his fifth
amendment privilege, so that such calling would have "been vain and fruitless, possibly
demanding disciplinary action against the prosecutor." Id. at 540. The dissent pointed out
that it is "not our role as appellate judges to conclude as an absolute fact" that Sellars
would have invoked the fifth amendment; if the prosecutor feared this result, "the short
answer would have been to try Sellars first." With regard to possible misconduct of the
prosecutor in calling the witness, the dissent stated: "Never have I heard of any such rule
of law." Id. at 549 n. 16.
57 This possibility seems implicit in the defense attorney's candid admission at oral
argument that he had not called Williams as a witness because he "had concluded that this
would not be in the best interests of his client." 400 U.S. at 88 n.19. The attorney had
presumably concluded that the same harm would not accrue if Williams invoked his
privilege as a witness for the prosecution, or, in any event, he was willing to run this risk in
order to force the prosecution to call Williams as a witness.58 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), held the compulsory process provision of
the sixth amendment binding on the states.
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then the defendant would have the burden of calling that witness
should he hope to impair the credibility of the prior testimony. In
those states in which a party is deemed to vouch for the credi-
bility of any witness whom he calls, the defendant may be serious-
ly curtailed in his ability to impeach his own witness. 9 The
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, however, abolish this doc-
trine of voucher and permit free impeachment by any party to the
case.60 A greater difficulty lies in the element of surprise attendant
on the prosecution's offering out-of-court statements at trial, at a
time when it may be too late for the defendant to call the de-
clarant as a witness in order to impeach him. Unless the usual
criminal rules of pretrial discovery are significantly changed, 61 this
element of surprise would be unavoidable in many cases.
Even if one assumes full rights of impeachment for both sides
and adequate pretrial notice of all out-of-court declarations that
the prosecution intends to use at trial, substantial objections still
exist to placing on the defendant the burden of calling these
witnesses for purposes of impeachment. As one commentator has
noted, 62 such a procedural burden handicaps the defendant in at
least three ways: (1) there is a time lapse between introduction of
the statement by the prosecution and examination of the witness
by the defendant; (2) the harmful evidence is heard twice, once in
the state's case and once when the witness testifies for the defen-
dant; and (3) the defendant is psychologically disadvantaged in
the eyes of the jury by having to call a witness who testifies
adversely to the defendant's interests. In Hoover v. Beto the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit summarized these objec-
tions with regard to the testimony of a witness named Sellars in
that case:
That Sellars was available to be called as a witness does not
mitigate the prosecution's misconduct here. The State sought
to shift to the defendant the risk of calling Sellars to the
stand. To accept the State's argument that the availability of
Sellars is the equivalent of putting him on the stand and
subjecting him to cross-examination would severely alter the
presumptions of innocence and the burdens of proof which
protect the accused. Hoover's undoubted right to call Sellars
as a witness in his behalf cannot be substituted for his Sixth
59 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, §§ 897-99, at 661-66
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 38, at 75-78; J. MAGUIRE, EvI-
DENCE-COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 41-43 (1947).
60 FED. R. Ev. 607.
61 E.g., only limited situations for obtaining depositions and discovery are provided for
in FED. R. CRIM. P. 15, 16.
62 The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 195 (1971).
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Amendment right to confront Sellars as a witness against
him.6 3
In view of these significant disadvantages, the criterion of either
equal availability or presumed equal unavailability does not ap-
pear to be an adequate replacement for the requirement that the
prosecution prove unavailability.
III. POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF THE
UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT
Once it is concluded that Barber's treatment of the unavailabil-
ity exception to the hearsay rule is not, or should not be, restrict-
ed to prior testimony, and that Dutton furnishes no analytically
satisfactory limitations on Barber, then the extent to which the
unavailability requirement should reasonably extend is yet to be
determined. That is, to which of the several exceptions to the
hearsay rule is the unavailability requirement applicable by force
of the confrontation clause?
There are certain hearsay exceptions recognized at common
law which do not require proof of unavailability. 64 It may be,
however, that these exceptions allow the introduction of evidence
which is no more reliable than those exceptions subject to the
standards of the unavailability requirement. Can it be asserted
that recorded recollection, for example, is more reliable than prior
testimony? Are statements of a co-conspirator more reliable than
statements against penal interest? Are excited utterances more
reliable than dying declarations? Even if it could be shown that
one set of exceptions is generally more reliable than another, such
a showing does not meet the argument deriving from the con-
frontation clause that whenever possible the defendant should be
permitted to demonstrate through confrontation that this apparent
reliability does not in fact exist. Therefore this constitutional
consideration would appear to be met by the expanded use of the
unavailability requirement rather than by any measure of relative
reliability.
- 439 F.2d 913, 924 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 467 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. en banc 1972). See
also note 56 supra.
64 FED. R. Ev. 804 lists former testimony, statements of recent perception, dying
declarations, statements against interest, statements of personal or family history, and
other exceptions having comparable guarantees of trustworthiness as hearsay exceptions
requiring proof of unavailability. The exceptions that do not require proof of unavailability
of the witness are listed in Rule 803. The comment to Rule 804(b) states that the
"exceptions evolved at common law.., furnish the basis" for determining whether proof
of unavailability is required. No other attempt is made to justify this dichotomy.
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The expansion of the unavailability requirement need not be as
broad as the range of all hearsay exceptions. There may be
peculiar hearsay exceptions where proof of unavailability should
not be required. Such exceptions might include those dealing with
party admissions, prior statements of a witness, business entries,
public records, and reputation. Nevertheless, in certain situations
the unavailability requirement may be appropriate even for these
exceptions.
A. Admissions
Admissions of a party have traditionally been admissible into
evidence against that party, not because they are necessarily
deemed reliable, but because of the adversary nature of our sys-
tem of litigation. 5 Except where vicarious admissions are in-
volved, there is no serious problem of determining unavailability,
for the defendant either takes the stand and is available for
cross-examination or refuses to do so and is therefore unavailable.
Difficult questions do arise, however, regarding the propriety of
waiving the unavailability requirement where the alleged admis-
sion is that of a co-conspirator or other person deemed to be an
agent of the defendant.6 6 The defendant in these situations usually
denies the agency relationship, and he almost always denies that
he authorized the alleged agent to make incriminatory remarks on
his behalf. The against-interest nature of such testimony, which
purportedly lends it an element of reliability, is not necessarily
present when the statement incriminates someone other than the
65 FED. R. Ev. 801(d)(2) excludes admissions altogether from the hearsay rule. The
comment to Rule 801 (d)(2) states:
Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay
on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary
system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule .... No
guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission. The
freedom which admissions have enjoyed from technical demands of searching
for an assurance of trustworthiness in some against-interest circumstance,
and from the restrictive influences of the opinion rule and the rule requiring
firsthand knowledge, when taken with the apparently prevalent satisfaction
with the results, calls for generous treatment of this avenue to admissibility.
(Emphasis added.)
66 FED. R. Ev. 801 (d)(2), in accord with common-law development, treats as admissions
not only statements of a party-opponent (including adoptive and authorized admissions),
but also statements of an agent "concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency ... made during the existence of the relationship," and statements by a
co-conspirator made "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." The agency
exception is broader than that allowed in many states, where agency admissions are
restricted to statements made while the agent is acting within the scope of his employment.
See Marshall v. Thomason, 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 177 (1962). The co-conspirator
exception, on the other hand, is narrower than that allowed by the Georgia court in Dutton
and by a few other jurisdictions which admit such statements when made during the
"concealment" phase of the conspiracy after its furtherance has ended.
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declarant.67 The concept of agency here is fictional at best, and it
should not be unnecessarily extended at the expense of the de-
fendant to cases in which the declarant is available for cross-
examination.
B. Prior Statements of a Witness
Rule 801(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence treats a prior
statement of an in-court witness as nonhearsay and thus admis-
sible where this statement: (1) is inconsistent with the witness's
present testimony; (2) is offered to rebut an inference of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive; or (3) is a statement
identifying a person after perceiving himP8 Hence unavailability
would seem not to be relevant here.
In cases where a witness who is not the defendant denies
making a former statement, or asserts lapse of memory, the issue
is not whether proof of unavailability should be required but
rather whether unavailability should necessarily be found to exist.
Nelson v. O'Neil69 seems to have settled the point that where the
issue is one of denial, the witness is deemed available. The con-
fusing rationale of the decision-which ignores Dutton's questions
of reliability and crucialness of the alleged former statement-is
that the defendant is better off than he would be if the witness
affirmed the prior statement. 70 Whatever may be the merits of this
67 While a confession is admissible against the person making the same as a
declaration against interest, what he says therein about others may be based
on spite, on fear, pique, malice, or other motives not leading to the truth.
Schepps v. State, 432 S.W.2d 926, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
68 The common law traditionally allows into evidence prior inconsistent statements of a
witness only for purposes of impeachment. Prior statements of a witness offered to rebut
an inference of recent fabrication or of improper influence or motive are generally admis-
sible only for purposes of rebutting such an inference. Prior statements of a witness's
identification of a person may generally be introduced either to impeach or to support
credibility, depending on the circumstances of the case. See comment to FED. R. Ev.
801(d); United States v. Forzano, 190 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1951). The federal rule, which
admits such evidence as substantive proof of guilt or innocence, constitutes a radical
departure from the common-law practice, although the proposal is probably more in line
with what actually occurs in jury deliberations when such evidence is introduced.
69402 U.S. 622 (1971).
70 The question presented in Nelson was whether cross-examination can be full and
effective where an out-of-court statement has been introduced into evidence and where the
alleged declarant of the statement, while testifying at trial, denies having made the state-
ment. The Court found no deprivation of sixth and fourteenth amendment rights, for the
testimony of the declarant had actually acted in the accused's favor:
Had Runnels [the declarant] in this case "affirmed the statement as his,"
the respondent [the accused] would certainly have been in far worse straits
than those in which he found himself when Runnels testified as he did ....
For once Runnels had testified that the statement was false, it could hardly
have profited the respondent for his counsel through cross-examination to try
to shake that testimony. If the jury were to believe that the statement was
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rationale, it should not be extended to situations in which the
witness asserts a lapse of memory. In that situation his silence
adds no evidential weight to either side, and he is clearly una-
vailable for cross-examination as to the out-of-court statement
and should be so treated for purposes of determining whether his
statement meets the confrontation requirements of reliability and
crucialness to the case. 71
C. State of Mind
Statements offered to prove the declarant's state of mind are,
strictly speaking, not hearsay where they are offered not to prove
the truth of the matter asserted therein but rather to prove a fact
or state of mind reasonably inferable therefrom. 72 The require-
ment of proof of unavailability of the witness should not be
dispensed with on this technical ground, however, because these
inferential "statements" are subject to the same risks of fabrica-
tion and mistake as are direct assertions. 73
D. Business Entries
As noted by McCormick, "After an uneasy history, unavaila-
false as to Runnels, it could hardly conclude that it was not false as to the
respondent as well.
The short of the matter is that ... Runnels' testimony respecting his al-
leged out-of-court statement was more favorable to the respondent than any
that cross-examination by counsel could possibly have produced, had Run-
nels "affirmed the statement as his."
Id. at 628-29.
71 In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), where a witness asserted lapse of
memory, the Court held that the witness's preliminary hearing testimony could be admitted
either on the theory that the witness was in court and subject to confrontation, or
alternatively on the theory that he was unavailable so that the evidence could come in as
prior testimony. These rationales are contradictory, and the former should be treated as
dictum because lapse of memory is generally regarded as satisfying the unavailability
requirement. See FED. R. Ev. 804(a)(3). The Court did not decide whether other
out-of-court statements of the witness allegedly made to a police officer were admissible
under the requirements of confrontation.
72 Hearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court assertion of a declarant offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See FED. R. Ev. 801(a)-(c). An
assertion not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therefore does not fall within
this definition. FED. R. Ev. 803(3) nevertheless includes state-of-mind assertions within
the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
One of the reasons offered by the Dutton court for finding that the defendant's right of
confrontation had not been violated by admission of the witness Williams' out-of-court
statement ("If it hadn't been for that dirty ... Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now.")
was that "the statement contained no express assertion about past fact, and consequently
it carried on its face a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight." 400
U.S. at 88. The justification suggested by the Court for admitting this evidence is less than
clear.
7 The Dutton dissent forcefully argued that Williams' alleged out-of-court statement
was so ambiguous as to be inherently unreliable. 400 U.S. at 104.
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bility has virtually disappeared as a requirement of entries in the
regular course of business." 74. The reason for this relaxation is
that an unfair burden would be imposed by requiring that the
proponent of the evidence either produce or show the unavailabil-
ity of first-hand participants in a multi-party enterprise of the sort
that often forms the basis of business entries. As a result, all that
is normally required at common law is verification by the super-
vising officer that the record has been regularly kept in the course
of business. 75
It does not follow, however, that a similar relaxation should
occur where confrontation rights are involved. It is inconvenient
for the prosecution to be required to produce an out-of-state
witness, and the common law generally imposed no such require-
ment.76 Nevertheless, this requirement was imposed by Barber as
a condition of confrontation. 77 It would seem therefore that the
state should be able to introduce evidence of a business entry only
where the first-hand participants to the transaction are unavail-
able. 78
E. Public Records and Judgments
The same rationale applicable to business entries can be used
for introducing evidence by means of public records. If a public
officer were required to appear in court every time public records
Courts have traditionally excluded state-of-mind assertions that "look back" to assert
memory or belief. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933). This has been the
rule except where such assertions relate to "the execution, revocation, identification, or
terms of declarant's will." FED. R. Ev. 803(3). As pointed out in United States v.
Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 377-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961), however,
admissible state-of-mind assertions are often grounded on an element of memory as well as
on present state of mind.7 4 MCCORMICK, supra note i, § 253, at 608 n.20.
75 1d. §§ 306, 312.
7 6 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723 (1968).
In his concurring opinion in Dutton Justice Harlan argued that business entries, official
statements, learned treatises, and trade reports should not be subject to the requirement of
proof of unavailability since production of declarants in these situations "would be unduly
inconvenient and of small utility to the defendant." 400 U.S. at 95-96. It should be
apparent that this inconvenience argument is directly at odds with the Barber rationale. If
evidence is useful to the prosecution, it is difficult to understand why the defendant should
be required to consider confrontation unuseful.
77 See text accompanying notes 9- 10 supra.
71 Tennessee permits the introduction against the defendant in criminal proceedings of a
medical certificate showing the results of an official blood test used to determine whether
an automobile driver is inebriated "if the person taking or causing to be taken the blood
sample and the person performing the test to such sample or both are available to testify at
the trial of the accused." TENN. CODE ANN. § 59- 1049 (1968). This requirement appar-
ently does not apply to breath or urine tests. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 59- 1044 (1968). It
is unclear whether the person who takes the blood sample or performs the test must
actually be called as a witness by the prosecution. See note 54 and accompanying text
supra.
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were sought to be put into evidence, a great amount of his time
would be consumed in testifying. In the many instances where the
officer has no first-hand knowledge of matters appearing in the
record, a showing of unavailability would not be appropriate.
Where information contained in public records has been sup-
plied by persons other than public officials, these declarants
should be called if they are available. If, however, the record is
based solely on matters observed, or factual findings made, by the
public official, then the official himself should be required to
testify in person if available.79
Many courts exclude a record of a relevant prior judgment as
hearsay when it is offered to prove a fact essential to sustain the
judgment.8 0 The Federal Rules also exclude such evidence in
criminal cases, except where there is a final judgment against the
defendant in another criminal case involving a possible penalty of
death or imprisonment in excess of one year.8' If a prior judgment
is entered on a plea of guilty the judgment arguably should come
in as a party admission.8 2 Where the conviction results from a
contested trial, it seems unnecessary to require proof of unavaila-
bility of the convicting judge or jury because even if they were
available their opinion of guilt would be based on hearsayP3 The
79 FED. R. Ev. 803(8) allows, as an exception to the hearsay rule, the introduction of
public records and reports against the defendant in criminal proceedings where these
records set forth "activities of the office or agency" or "matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law." The rule permits such records to be introduced in civil cases, and against
the government in criminal cases, only where they set forth "factual findings resulting from
an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law." The limitation on use of
investigatory findings, according to the comment, is made "in view of the almost certain
collision with confrontation rights which would result from their use against the accused in
a criminal case." It is not at all clear why the drafters concluded that there would be no
collision with confrontation rights where public records of "activities" or "matters ob-
served" are involved.
8 0 j. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN, J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 539-41 (5th ed. 1965).8 1 FED. R. Ev. 803(22).
82 FED. R. Ev. 801 (d)(2), which permits evidence of admissions of a party-opponent to
be admitted in evidence, should be read as limited by FED. R. Ev. 803(22), which allows
into evidence only judgments of conviction punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year regardless of whether the judgment is "entered after a trial or upon a plea of
guilty."
Arguably a civil judgment entered against a party by agreement could be introduced
under the Federal Rules against that party as an admission in a subsequent criminal action
to prove any fact essential to sustain the civil judgment. Courts might refuse to admit such
judgments, however, because there is a difference in burden -of proof between civil and
criminal actions, and because this procedure would tend to discourage the out-of-court
settlement of civil actions.
83See State v. Paiz, 34 N.M. 108, 277 P. 966 (1929). In Paiz the prosecution called a
justice of the peace who had bound the defendant over for trial in the case to testify
regarding the defendant's confession and to state that he found the defendant guilty of the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court held this procedure to be
prejudicial error because the testimony constituted a legal conclusion that was solely
within the province of the jury to decide.
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admissibility of a relevant prior judgment as proof of a fact essen-
tial to sustain that judgment clearly involves questions of the
reliability and crucialness of the evidence. Production of the
fact-finder would not, however, add appreciably to the defendant's
confrontation protection.
F. Reputation Evidence
Reputation evidence offered against the accused is generally
highly suspect because it may be based on groundless rumor
about which the witness has no actual first-hand knowledge8 4 The
Federal Rules of Evidence provide that character reputation may
be proved by evidence of personal opinion.85 This type of evi-
dence seems more reliable than evidence of hearsay reputation,
and if available it should probably be required whenever reputa-
tion evidence is offered against the accused. Where the witness
has no personal knowledge of the reputation in issue, proof of
unavailability of the person or persons who caused the witness to
form his opinion should also be required.
IV. CONCLUSION
Dutton v. Evans offers no ascertainable and manageable criteria
for limiting the scope of the Barber v. Page unavailability require-
ment. Moreover, the thrust of Barber indicates that its appli-
cability is not limited only to prior testimony. While courts may
be able to assess the reliability and crucialness of out-of-court
statements with some rough degree of accuracy, it is difficult to
understand how these factors can be balanced meaningfully in
determining whether to dispense with the unavailability require-
ment. The concept of unavailability furnishes a relatively certain
and easily applied standard whose application in many instances
will enable courts to avoid delving into far more complex issues of
reliability and crucialness. Moreover, requiring production of the
4 The general rule is that a reputation witness "is not allowed to base his testimony on
anything but hearsay." This testimony
at its best opens a tricky line of inquiry as to a shapeless and elusive subject
matter. At its worst it opens a veritable Pandora's box of irresponsible
gossip, innuendo and smear.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477, 480 (1948) (emphasis added).
85 FED. R. Ev. 405(a):
In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person
is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allow-
able into relevant specific instances of conduct.
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witness whenever possible assures the defendant the maximum
available protection offered by cross-examination under oath and
by jury observation of the witness's demeanor. There is no satis-
factory substitute for this protection.
